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I. INTRODUCTION
The history of Haiti is a tragic tale of political corruption
and military violence. It is a tale of ceaseless coups, assassina-
tions, massive violations of human rights, and a sharply divided
people with starkly opposed visions of state and nation under-
girded by a rigid class structure. If the Haitian "mind" is used as
a metaphor to signify the political, economic, and social positions
of the majority, Haitians have been of one mind only twice in
their history. Their first coming together as a people was be-
tween 1791 and 1804, when, after a brutal, protracted thirteen-
year struggle against slavery and French colonialism, the Hai-
tian people won their independence, thus creating one of the first
independent nations and the first black nation of the Americas.
The second was in 1990, when the vast majority of Haitians
elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the presidency in the country's
first democratic and free election. The events that have occurred
since that election, however, reflect the deep divisions that de-
veloped between these two defining moments.
The December 1990 election of Aristide did not lead to peace
and prosperity. Even before Aristide took his oath of office, and
during the first several months of his term, the military and
paramilitary forces, with the outright support of the other corpo-
rativist anti-democratic forces, challenged his legitimacy in a
series of unsuccessful coup attempts. In September 1991, they
finally succeeded in overthrowing him. The coup was not only
successful; it also resulted in a three-year reign of terror that left
approximately five thousand people dead, thousands more bru-
talized, and the country in financial ruin.
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After almost three years of unsuccessful international efforts
to negotiate the restoration of the Aristide government, the Car-
ter delegation, backed by the threat of international military in-
tervention, reached an agreement with the Haitian military
leaders that allowed the democratically elected government to
return to power. On October 15, 1994, Jean Bertrand-Aristide
was returned to power as Haiti's leader, the first time anywhere
that a democratically elected president replaced the very de facto
military leaders who deposed him. The reinstatement held great
promise for the Haitian people, who have long lived in a land of
brutal political violence and abject poverty. It opened the pos-
sibility that Haiti may begin to create the conditions needed for
the blooming of democracy.
But transitions from authoritarian regimes to democratic
ones are problematic at best. Serious threats to the formation of
a democratic government by former coup leaders and their fol-
lowers include strong possibilities of renewed violations of hu-
man rights on a massive scale and a return to state-sponsored
repression. Indeed, authoritarianism cannot be controlled and
obliterated merely because many sectors of society approve of
implementing democratic methods in the development of a na-
tion. Powerful social, political, and economic forces block the
journey from dictatorship to democracy. These underlying forces
are an organic conception of society based on a rigid class struc-
ture that leads to a dualistic vision of the social order; corpora-
tism; anomie and unlawfulness; and extreme concentrations of
institutional, economic, and social power. The same unusual
combination of factors had led to massive human rights abuses,
including the deaths, tortures, and beatings of thousands of
people during the 1991-1994 coup period.
Much remains to be done to bring democracy to Haiti. Eco-
nomic, political, and social stability must be assured. The corpo-
rativist political and social structure has to be fundamentally
transformed so that the less privileged classes, which make up
over ninety percent of the Haitian people, can enjoy the basic ne-
cessities that ensure a dignified life. Institutional structures,
such as limitations on the executive branch, an independent,
non-corrupt, competent judiciary, and a representative congres-
sional branch, must be developed and stabilized. The rule of law
and the guarantees of due process have to be consolidated. They
must become basic requirements of social interaction and ac-
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cepted as such in both public and private life. This is necessary
not only to protect human rights and the democratic process, but
also to reach a satisfactory level of economic, political, and social
development.
In the long run, democracy cannot be created in Haiti with-
out the internalization by the Haitian people of the legitimacy of
a constitutional system based on the rule of law. They must also
internalize universal standards of achievement and competition
necessary to the proper functioning of a democracy. A belief
structure that celebrates the overpowering significance of status
and connections-a mainstay of Haitian society and one which
severely cripples the transition to democracy-must be funda-
mentally altered.
Haitians must create a society based on the establishment of
a deliberative democracy-a society that requires equal partici-
pation and rational discourse among all segments of the popu-
lace. This discourse is essential for the creation of a moral con-
sciousness of humanity that recognizes the value of human
rights and abhors any notion that disregards them. The princi-
ple of democratic legitimacy requires a continuous order of mu-
tually assured and encouraged autonomy in which political deci-
sions are manifestly based on the judgments of citizens who are
perceived as, and are in fact, free and equal persons. It requires
that the expression of self-governing capacities operate both
within the formal institutions of politics and in the affairs of
daily life. The democratic order must also satisfy the conditions
of equal freedom and autonomy that give it definition.
This democratic conception suggests several possible ave-
nues to travel in attempting to attack the apparently intractable
problems in Haiti. Indeed, the preliminary plan adopted by the
Aristide government, with the help of the international commu-
nity, attempted to implement some of these goals through sev-
eral specific actions. The plan was to assure security, revitalize
the economy, restructure institutions to eliminate corruption and
incompetence and thus improve the administration of justice,
and change the relationship between the small elite ruling class
and the vast majority (everyone else). Predictably, positive
changes have been slow in coming. Attempted reforms have not
always been successful. Opposition to reforms have come from
every sector of Haitian society and from the international com-
munity, particularly from the United States. The opposition, of
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course, differs depending on the particular reform at issue. Nev-
ertheless, while the problems are daunting, the first steps, how-
ever small and halting, have been taken. The problems are no
longer fueled by the tyranny of a dictatorship dedicated to mur-
der, torture, and corruption; they are the problems of an inexpe-
rienced and incompetent democracy with a people yearning to
assume the responsibilities of citizenship and striving to eradi-
cate the violence of the past.
Democratic change requires great sacrifices. The scope of
required changes in Haiti, however, is so massive, complex, and
interrelated, that each suggested reform has an impact, either
positive or negative and sometimes both, on almost every other
segment of planned change. The one constant requirement for
change is security. In the remainder of this essay, I will thus fo-
cus my comments on the issue of security.
II. RESTORING DEMOCRACY
The United States and many other countries, such as Ar-
gentina, Canada, France, Tobago, and Trinidad, took leading
roles in the Multi-National Force (MNF), which restored the
democratically elected government to power. These countries
and others in the hemisphere initially worked with the United
States through the Organization of American States (OAS) in
calling for a trade embargo of Haiti, launching an intense diplo-
matic initiative in the hope of peacefully resolving Haiti's politi-
cal crisis, and sending the U.N. International Civilian Mission in
Haiti (MICIVIH) and the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights to bear witness to Haiti's appalling human rights situa-
tion during the 1991-1994 coup period.
The international community, led by the United States, took
these unprecedented measures in Haiti because of a sincere se-
curity concern. It was in the self-interest of every democratically
elected government in the region to do so. Anyone contemplating
the overthrow of a democratically elected government or the
commission of massive human rights abuses anywhere in the
region, or indeed in the world, can now expect a strong, unified
hemispheric and international response. Coups will not be al-
lowed to succeed. The international community's success in
helping to reverse the coup in Haiti and creating a secure envi-
ronment is a success for a policy of supporting democracy and se-
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curity in the world at large.
Indeed, the often publicly repeated U.S. security and foreign
policy interest in Haiti was to "restore democracy." President
Clinton, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and influential
senators and congresspersons continuously made statements to
this effect. There was, however, perhaps an even more urgent
political concern for the Clinton administration. These officials
wished to eliminate the flow of Haitian refugees to the United
States and thus diffuse a potential political problem for Clinton's
1996 presidential re-election bid.
The steps toward restoring democracy were slow in coming.
After almost three years of frustrating international efforts to
negotiate the return of the democratically elected government,
President Clinton made a televised address directly threatening
the Haitian military that it must relinquish power or be forced
out of Haiti. He then sent a delegation consisting of former
President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and General Colin
Powell to Haiti to negotiate the departure of the military coup
leaders. While the agreement was controversial, it did lead to
the departure of these leaders and the arrival of approximately
twenty-thousand U.S. troops and a smattering of troops from
other nations-the MNF.
The United States continuously claimed that security was a
prerequisite to the transition to democracy in Haiti. Its stated
goals and policies, however, were often undermined by contradic-
tory actions which seemed to defeat any opportunity to create a
secure environment. Moreover, the U.S. defense establishment
has been involved in activities in Haiti that intentionally un-
dermined the democratically elected government and supported
the military coup leaders and their paramilitary auxiliary forces
which, even today, continue to terrorize the Haitian people.
To begin with, the assertion of power by the United States
during the transition period-between September 19 and Octo-
ber 15, 1994-was uncertain and incremental. One of the major
goals of this invasion was to disarm the Haitian military and
paramilitary forces. Even before the reinstatement of Aristide,
the democratically elected government sought assistance for dis-
armament from the United States and the United Nations. The
U.N. Secretary General's Report of July 15, 1994, which details
the original mandate of the United Nations Mission in Haiti
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(UNMIH), the successor to the MNF, states in Point 9 that one of
the tasks of the United Nations forces is to "assist the legitimate
authorities of Haiti in ... [a]ssuring public order, including the
disarmament of paramilitary groups." Neither the United Na-
tions nor the United States has attempted to fulfill this man-
date. Under the Carter agreement, the United States had
pledged to cooperate closely with the Haitian military, but, by
doing so, failed to take effective action to bring the army and its
allies under control. In several instances during the September
19 to October 15, 1994, transition period, for example, U.S.
forces passively observed as attaches murdered pro-Aristide
demonstrators. The United States did take some steps to disarm
the military, particularly of its heavy weaponry, but it never se-
riously attempted to disarm the paramilitary forces. The rea-
sons appeared to be the fear that possible American casualties
would produce a political backlash in the United States, as they
had in Somalia, and the U.S. commitment under the September
18, 1994, agreement with the coup leaders that the United
States would cooperate with but not supersede the Haitian mili-
tary and police. Moreover, the U.S. defense establishment
feared that an Aristide government, without opposition from
these corporative forces, would not be a government it could con-
trol. But the failure to search for the estimated 250,000 auto-
matic weapons, hidden in caches all over the country, has led to
violence against the democratic government and poses a continu-
ing threat to its very survival. Indeed, for Haiti to achieve sig-
nificant and sustainable demilitarization of the public order, de-
cisive steps have to be taken to reform the police, and to confront
the former military forces and the paramilitary forces-rural
affiliates of section chiefs or urban attach6s-that remain under-
ground. The Aristide government had developed a plan to do so
and the Preval government, improvising as circumstances
change, continues to execute the plan.
III. POLICE, MILITARY, AND PARAMILITARY FORCES
A. The Police and the Justice System
Until Aristide's reinstatement, Haiti lacked even the pre-
tense of having a professional police force. Moreover, until
sometime in 1995, and certainly during the coup period, the po-
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lice had been members of the armed forces, and received no po-
lice training. Members were rotated in and out of the police and
army. In some cases, an officer literally had two uniforms
hanging in a closet and would pick out the appropriate one-
police blue or military khaki-depending on the month or the
assignment. Haiti's police did not "walk the beat", investigate
crimes, or perform any other police functions. Instead, they
murdered and beat people, rode in trucks with high caliber
weapons, and shot first and asked questions later-and then
only to interrogate the innocent person who fell into their hands
about his or her political opinions and activities. The police were
not only for hire to the rich, but would arrest someone on the
mere unsubstantiated complaint of some favored person-on
flimsy evidence provided by a jealous neighbor, jilted lover, or
ambitious farmer who wanted more water from the irrigation
canal or a piece of particularly fertile land. Law enforcement
was intensively political, not neutral or objective.
In addition, the entire justice system was corrupt and extor-
tion thrived at every level. People paid the police to arrest a ri-
val; prosecutors and judges demanded payment before opening
an investigation or issuing an order. Section chiefs arbitrarily
imposed taxes that were not found in any law and then threat-
ened those who refused to pay with prison or a beating. Jailers
often demanded payment before a family was allowed to bring
food to a detainee, and also extorted money from desperate pris-
oners aiming to avoid beatings or death.
There was no difference between an arrest and an abduc-
tion. Without a "paper trail," the person slipped into a black
hole of Haitian detention centers, official and unofficial. These
centers uniformly failed to keep registers as they are required to
do under both Haitian and international law. Unofficial deten-
tion centers, of course, are illegal, so access to family, lawyers,
and medical care and to the outside world was impossible. It
was precisely during these extensive periods of incommunicado
detention that the detainee was most at risk of being tortured,
beaten, or killed.
Conditions in Haitian prisons and detention centers were
inhumane and cruel. These prisons-most often remnants of
garrisons built by the U.S. occupying forces between 1915 and
1934-lacked all basic services: electricity, potable water, toilets,
and medical supplies. Even in a country as desperate as Haiti,
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the prisons were materially worse than the normal, appalling
living conditions of the desperately poor masses. Detainees were
kept in close, overcrowded quarters, and prisoners were forced to
sleep on the floor. Men and women were not segregated. Sexual
abuse was common, and diseases were easily transmitted. Chil-
dren, who, of course, are particularly vulnerable, were impris-
oned with adults.
The armed forces, including the army, the police, rural sec-
tions chiefs, attach6s, members of the armed paramilitary group
Front for the Advancement and Progress in Haiti (FRAPH),
threatened, beat, and killed thousands of people, including
judges, prosecutors, and lawyers. Indeed, on December 14, 1993,
these forces executed Justice Minster Guy Malary in broad day-
light because he was investigating the execution of a prominent
Aristide supporter, and because he attempted to enforce the rule
of law. A Haitian proverb summarizes well the Haitian people's
attitude toward the law, and its representatives, particularly the
police: "law is paper, bayonets are steel."
Aristide understood that a democracy must first have a sys-
tem of justice that adhered to the rule of law. The police had to
be reformed if there was any hope for democracy. The Aristide
government attempted to deal with the police force by first creat-
ing an interim police force (IPSF), purging it of human rights
violators, and then attempting to create a new and professional
National Police Force. From the first day of Aristide's rein-
statement, Haitians strongly voiced their objections to the con-
tinued involvement of former members of the Haitian Armed
Forces (FAD'H) in IPSF and their possible involvement in the
new National Police Force. Nevertheless, recycled FAD'H per-
sonnel made up three quarters of IPSF. The unstated reasons
for this continued involvement were the concerns of the United
States about the need to maintain established institutions and
ensure political and ideological counterbalance. The stated rea-
sons, voiced by some Haitian officials and by the international
community, were that these individuals would bring a degree of
experience to the job and that their involvement would discour-
age violent activities of a major group of disaffected and poten-
tially destabilizing individuals in the society at large.
In response to these stated reasons for employing FAD'H
members, the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment (U.S.AID) created a series of programs for the training and
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reinsertion into society of these members who were not selected
for public security programs. Unfortunately, the programs were
budgeted to absorb many, but not all, of the former FAD'H mem-
bers who were not integrated into IPSF. Moreover, many of the
FAD'H members who were integrated into IPSF were not al-
lowed to be members of the National Police Force. On December
5, 1994, President Aristide issued a presidential decree formally
dissolving the IPSF. Over the years, as classes of the newly
trained National Police Force have graduated, members of the
IPSF, particularly former FAD'H members, have been demobi-
lized. The plan is that when all of the purging and training is
completed, Haiti will have a professional, well-trained force of
between five thousand and six thousand people.
Both the stated and unstated reasons for using former
FAD'H members in the police force proved to be seriously flawed.
FAD'H members proved to have no professional competence and
little interest in obtaining such skills. In addition, the former
members of FAD'H have been involved in a long series of serious,
destabilizing, violent acts, including attacks on the main Haitian
National Police headquarters and Parliament, assassinations of
police officers, murders of two pro-Aristide congressmen, and
conspiracies to assassinate Aristide and Preval. They have also
formed criminal gangs, kidnapped several wealthy people and
held them for ransom, and committed armed robberies. Until
the Haitian National Police Force is professionalized, the only
hope for restraining these killers is the continued presence of
United Nations peacekeeping forces. But these forces, originally
scheduled to leave Haiti by November 31, 1997, actually left in
December 1997. The United Nations, however, did leave a small
number of police officials to continue the training of the National
Police Force. Presently, former FAD'H members represent a po-
tentially disaffected, destabilizing group, and the National Police
Force still lacks the professional skills to create and maintain a
secure environment. These harsh, unpleasant realities have led
President Clinton to leave several hundred U.S. troops in Haiti
for an indefinite period, even though there is strong opposition to




The 1987 Haitian Constitution mandates that the country
maintain an army. Thus, some form of army must exist until the
Constitution is legally amended. Since Aristide's return to
power in October 1994, public opinion in Haiti urging the aboli-
tion of the army has been almost universal. Consistent with this
strong sentiment, the Aristide government enacted a series of re-
forms that virtually dissolved the Haitian army by February
1995. By June 1995, the army had been reduced to a fifty-man
presidential band.
The problem remains, however, as to what to do with the
purged members of FAD'H. Indeed, during President Preval's
term, these disaffected former army members have continued to
wage a campaign of violence. In addition to the crimes discussed
above, the former FAD'H members have murdered elected offi-
cials, systematically assassinated at least a dozen police officers
between April 27 and August 31, 1996, and organized gangs that
terrorize ghetto neighborhoods, sometimes murdering pro-
government civic leaders, and selling and disbursing narcotics
among the poor masses.
The National Police Force is itself in need of substantially
more and better training and experience if it is to eradicate a
nearly two-hundred year tradition of arbitrary behavior and re-
pression. Indeed, the approximately fifty-three hundred member
force has been widely accused of resorting to some of the harsh
practices of its predecessors. According to a report by a coalition
of human rights groups issued on January 22, 1997, and a sepa-
rate report issued by MICIVIH on August 2, 1996, in the ap-
proximately eighteen months since its deployment, the Haitian
National Police Force has committed serious abuses, including
torture and summary executions. These reports claim that the
police have killed anywhere from twenty-six to forty-six civilians
and have wounded many others while engaged in policing func-
tions. Simultaneously, these reports claim that, despite these
problems, as well as serious deficiencies in experience and a dire
lack of equipment, the police were generally adhering to the rule
of law and doing an effective job. Moreover, the phenomenon of
massive and systematic violations of human rights that typified
the de facto rule has disappeared.
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C. The Paramilitary Forces
In order for Haiti to achieve significant and sustainable
demilitarization of public order, decisive steps must be taken to
confront the paramilitary forces-rural affiliates of section chiefs
or urban attach6s-that remain underground. Disarmament has
not occurred because the United States, the MNF, and the
United Nations peacekeeping force have refused to alter their
position against disarmament. They have continuously refused
to hunt for weapon caches. Haitian authorities, of course, simply
do not have the power or skills to disarm these forces by them-
selves. Moreover, complete disarmament may be impractical, if
not almost impossible, because Haiti shares a porous border with
the Dominican Republic and because huge weapon caches are
hidden throughout Haiti.
Given this reality, the most effective strategy may be to pur-
sue individuals rather than weapons. The theory is that, once
their impunity to sponsor or undertake terrorist and criminal
acts is challenged by the aggressive and systematic application
of legal prosecutions, Haiti's paramilitary forces will recede into
the background. Indeed, there have been some positive devel-
opments along those lines. For example, for the first time in
Haitian history, a government agent has been convicted for
committing a political murder. Gerard Gustove ("Zimbabwe"),
an attach6, and prominent-member of FRAPH, has been con-
victed of murder for the political assassination of Antoine Iz-
mery, committed during the coup period. Emmanuel Constant, a
former FRAPH leader, has been arrested in the United States
and found to be deportable. Unfortunately, it is highly unlikely
that he will be deported, because the United States made a deal
with him that allows him to stay here. If he is ever returned to
Haiti, however, he will stand trial for committing human rights
violations, including murder. Finally, the Special Investigative
Units created during Aristide's term, and consisting of highly
trained police investigators and prosecutors, continue into
Preval's administration to concentrate on investigations of seri-
ous human rights violations committed during the coup period.
This strategy of prosecuting individuals depends, of course,
on the existence of a functioning police force and justice system,
as well as secure prisons. It also requires a strong linkage
among police, judicial officers, and community-based civic-society
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organizations. The latter groups, which are among the most de-
veloped elements of Haitian society, could be called on to help
create accountability, partnerships, and oversight.
The National Police Force, judiciary, and prison system re-
main insufficiently developed to perform their tasks. The help of
the international community, therefore, is crucial. It must help
Haitian officials find, obtain evidence against, and prosecute the
most notorious human rights violators. The United States must
play a central role in this crucial task. But the United States
has done the opposite; it has actively protected human rights
violators in an attempt to hide its past connections to the dicta-
torship.
IV. UNITED STATES OPPOSITION TO DEMOCRATIC CHANGE
While the United States publicly professes its full support
for the creation of a democracy in Haiti, particularly in creating
a secure environment and bringing to justice the perpetrators of
massive human rights violations, several actions taken by the
U.S. government work directly against its stated goal. The U.S.
defense establishment, led by the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), used and continues to engage in practices in Haiti that are
certain to harm the chances for democracy to develop and are
simply unacceptable in the intelligence services of a democratic
nation. For example, it maintained foreign agents, or assets, on
the payroll even after CIA officials had credible information that
they were involved in assassinations, torture, and drug smug-
gling. In addition, CIA officials hid information from relevant
U.S. officials and Congress, and directed a misinformation cam-
paign against Aristide.
This campaign to sully the reputation of Aristide and thus
limit his power to make fundamental changes in Haiti has been
particularly destructive to the creation of democracy. Certain
factions of the U.S. government have always had serious reser-
vations about Aristide. From the outset, President Clinton's goal
of restoring Aristide to power was undermined by officials in the
defense establishment-the CIA, Pentagon, and State Depart-
ment. Early in Aristide's exile, for example, the CIA distributed
a report that branded him as mentally unstable, claiming that
he had, for an extended period, been a patient in a mental hospi-
tal in Canada. Senator Jesse Helms, basing his conclusion on
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this CIA report, referred to Aristide as a "psychopath" and a
"demonstrable killer." The report turned out to be a complete
sham. The media, after extensive investigations undertaken by
the Miami Herald and the Cable News Network (CNN), found no
record of Aristide being treated for mental depression in Canada.
The report was revealed to be based on unconfirmed information
supplied by the very coup leaders who overthrew him. Sometime
after this discovery, the CIA even admitted that it had been
paying individuals in the Haitian military leadership for this
kind of information since the early 1980's.
Unfortunately, these revelations did not end the campaign
against Aristide. These very same U.S. government agencies
and officials continued to spread false and unsubstantiated in-
formation about Aristide and his government even after he had
been reinstated to power. For example, throughout Aristide's
term and into President Preval's term, certain journalists, ob-
taining their information from these suspect U.S. sources,
claimed that Aristide's people were involved in approximately
eighty murders. Even officials of the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-
Prince have stated that there is no evidence to support these al-
legations or to link Aristide to any of the murders. Moreover,
they have estimated the number of politically motivated deaths
to be ten, not eighty. Furthermore, the U.S. Embassy officials
believe that those who were murdered were most likely victims
of supporters and members of the former de facto government.
More recently, certain U.S. officials have portrayed Aristide
as being anti-democratic and a serious impediment to the Preval
government's attempt to improve the lot of Haiti's masses, sim-
ply because he is opposed to the total privatization of Haiti's
state-owned industries. These officials claim that Aristide is op-
posed to this plan merely for political purposes, so that he can
strengthen his position and thus regain the presidency in the
next presidential election scheduled for 2000. While it is correct
to claim that Aristide is opposed to many aspects of the privati-
zation plan, he is not opposed to all parts of it. He is certainly
not attempting to harm Haiti's starving masses. Indeed, quite
the contrary; he is representing a large peasant movement that
is strongly opposed to the current privatization plan. Neverthe-
less, allegations that his position simply reflects political expedi-
ency continue to flow from U.S. officials.
These attacks on Aristide, however, are only a single part of
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the activities that are harming the opportunities for democracy
in Haiti. The U.S. defense establishment, in a variety of other
ways, continues to oppose the democratization of Haiti. These
agencies are protecting the very military coup leaders and their
supporting cadre that terrorized the Haitian people for decades.
For example, the U.S. military forces have consistently refused
to return 160,000 pages of documents, photographs, and video
and audio-cassettes they seized from FAD'H and FRAPH head-
quarters during the initial intervention in September 1994. The
documents contain information about murders, tortures, beat-
ings, and the relationships between FAD'H, FRAPH, and the
CIA. They would, of course, be crucial evidence in criminal
prosecutions.
Moreover, the United States allowed the leader of FRAPH,
Emmanuel Constant, who had been a paid employee of the CIA
from at least 1991 to 1994, to enter the United States surrepti-
tiously, knowing full well that he is wanted on murder charges
in Haiti. Almost immediately upon discovering that Constant
was in the United States, the Haitian government formerly re-
quested that he be arrested and extradited to Haiti. But it took
the U.S. government almost two years to respond to the Haitian
government's continuing extradition request. Although he was
finally arrested and found to be deportable, the U.S. government,
led by the CIA, has cut a deal with him. The arrangement al-
lows Constant to stay in the United States indefinitely in ex-
change for his promise not to talk about his relationship with the
CIA. Indeed, he is free to leave and return to the United States
at his own discretion.
Besides training many of the FAD'H and police leaders who
have terrorized Haiti during this century, when Aristide re-
turned to power in 1994, U.S. forces helped FAD'H and FRAPH
members escape Haiti, break down their weapons, and hide
them in caches all over the country. The United Nations esti-
mates that some 250,000 automatic weapons are hidden in
caches all over Haiti. FAD'H and FRAPH are still using these
weapons to commit murders and robberies and to terrorize the
Haitian people.
This is not all, however. Despite the U.S. government's as-
sistance in reforming the Haitian judicial system through train-
ing programs for judges and lawyers, certain agencies of the U.S.
government have sometimes interfered in the prosecutions of
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human rights violators. These actions, of course, undermine the
effort to create a secure environment which will allow democracy
to flourish.
The most infamous example of this interference in Haiti, but
certainly not the only one, is the Marcel Morissaint case. Mr.
Morissaint had been arrested by U.S. troops when they first en-
tered Haiti in September 1994 for storing automatic weapons in
his home. Soon thereafter, a warrant was issued for his arrest
on charges of murder in the Guy Malary and Antoine Izmery
cases. As part of my investigation into the murders, I inter-
viewed Morissaint several times and later verified that his alle-
gations about the U.S. involvement with the Haitian military
coup leaders were accurate.
I first interviewed Mr. Morissaint at the Haitian National
Penitentiary in July 1995. At that time, he promised to tell me
about the U.S. involvement in Haiti and the murders of several
prominent Haitians if I could get him transferred to the Petion-
ville Prison. He feared for his life if he had to remain in the Na-
tional Penitentiary because security was lax and because he was
marked for death if he gave us any information or indeed even if
he was seen speaking to us. In the Petionville Prison, he would
be locked up by himself and have better security. After several
days of attempting to see and convince Haitian officials to trans-
fer Morissaint to the Petionville Prison, I was unable to get him
transferred. But, having providence on my side, the Haitian
government randomly selected Mr. Morissaint to be transferred
to that prison because the National Penitentiary was so over-
crowded. Morissaint believed that I had secured his transfer,
and thus agreed to speak with me. It was in the Petionville
Prison that he began to reveal his secrets. He decided to help us
because, he claimed, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and
the CIA-the agencies he worked for-had abandoned him. He
feared that agents of these agencies would assassinate him. The
interview I describe below took place on August 12, 1995.
Having evaluated conditions at the Petionville Prison we
told Ms. Uranie, the Haitian government official who accompa-
nied me and my partner-my translator and fellow investigator,
Jean-Jean Pierre-that these areas were not suitable for inter-
viewing Mr. Morissaint. We asked that he be brought next door
to the police station where the duty officer vacated his room to
enable us to interview Mr. Morissaint on his own. Ms. Uranie
[Vol. 29:1-2
REMARKS
sat outside the door, just out of earshot. Mr. Morissaint asked if
his handcuffs could be removed and we agreed; he remained
seated throughout the interview, only pausing in his replies on
the few occasions when one of the police had to pass through the
room to go next door.
We began the interview by asking if he was content with the
security arrangements and he said: "Yes, there is plenty of secu-
rity here." We informed him that we had discussed his security
needs with the Minister of Justice and even the President and he
seemed pleased. We pointed out that on this occasion we had se-
cured privacy and protection for him to be able to talk with us
without being overseen or overheard and he seemed duly im-
pressed, as were we.
We then explained that in order for us to be of any further
help to him, we had to have a sense of what his cooperation
would mean to us. We told him that we needed witnesses to the
Izm6ry, Malary, and Vincent killings; who planned them, who
ordered them, who participated in them. He then said: "The
problem is, if I am going to cooperate, what about security for my
family and my children as well as for me? I am ready to give you
my full cooperation." He claimed that his present detention had
nothing to do with his crimes as an attach6 but that: "There are
people who paid to put me in prison because of my work for the
DEA and CIA."
Asked about the size of his family, he said he had a wife,
four children, a little sister and a father. All of them would need
protection if he were to cooperate.
We asked him a series of questions of which the following is
close to a verbatim transcription. In any event, it represents the
substance of what was said.
IS: What was your role as an attach6; to which units were you
attached and with whom did you work?
MM: I was an Anti-Gang attach6. I was recruited by the
United States Embassy to be a spy, an informant for them on
Anti-Gang activities. They told me to infiltrate the Anti-Gang
unit so I could pass on the information about drug deals. One
day I heard the discussion about Izm~ry [sic] and about how
the operation was conducted.
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IS: What did you hear?
MM: I heard the discussion about using the car that would be
[was?] used to crash into his car. I had seen his car parked in
the lot in front of the Anti-Gang headquarters.
IS: You mean Izm6ry or Malary?
MM: Malary, not Izm6ry.
IS: Were you present at the killing or at its planning?
MM: I only knew about it afterwards, not before. I heard
about it in the Anti-Gang headquarters parking lot. I came
and I stood next to the car and saw the guys who had been
participants talking. Eric Avril said: "The only regret that I
have was one of us was wounded." I said, "Where did this
happen '
IS: Who killed Malary?
MM: Eric Avril actually shot Malary. Lionel Cadet, Lieuten-
ant Cesar Abellard, and Salem all participated in the murder.
(I do not know any other name for Salem).
IS: What was the Zel Sekey?
MM: That was our team. Major Renault was the commander
of this group. He was under Jackson Joanis and Michel Fran-
cois. Joanis was the one to whom they reported back. The
other guys were in it, Eric Arvil, Lionel Cadet, Lieutenant Ce-
sar Abellard, Salem. Francois was the boss.
IS: What about La Belle Equipe du Champ de Mars?
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MM: I do not know anything about that.
IS: Do you know the true names of [and I led him through all
the pseudonyms in the Izm~ry indictment without explaining
the source of the connection]?
MM: Gros Fanfan is Lucien Alexandre. I have met Zimbabwe
and Ernest Ravix in jail but I did not know them before. I do
not know any of the others.
IS: As an attach6, did you have an identification card and
were you paid?
MM: I had an identification card. But I never received a
penny. Attach6s are not paid at all.
IS: You mentioned involvement in drugs, who was involved?
MM: These guys [meaning all the Anti-Gang people] were
heavily involved in drugs. Michel Francois was the leader.
He worked with the Colombians to smuggle drugs through
Haiti into the United States.
IS: Who did you report to in the United States Embassy-in
the DEA and the CIA?
MM: Ben Butcher (Potutchere?) at the United States Em-
bassy was the head of the DEA and he and another guy, Bill,
who was a CIA man. They were both black, both spoke Creole.
I always reported to them. I was paid different amounts at
different times, sometimes $500 and sometimes $300.
IS: What about Marc Kernizan, was he involved in Anti-Gang
drug activity?
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MM: He was with the thirtieth company, not the Anti-Gang.
[Mr. Morissaint seems to have nothing on him.]
IS: Where were the drugs coming from and where were they
going?
MM: Joanis and Francois, particularly Francois, who was the
leader, were involved with drugs. The drugs were exported to
the United States and imported from Columbia.
IS: What kind of drugs?
MM: Cocaine and sometimes heroin. [Mr. Morissant stared at
me as if I were an idiot.]
IS: If Joanis and Francois were extradited, would you be
willing to testify against them in drug cases?
MM: Yes. But I would prefer not to have to testify. I would
prefer if I could give you the information so you could get
these guys without me having to appear in court.
IS: We have all the information we need. We have informa-
tion about all of these people and we have information about
you. We do not want sources of information, we want wit-
nesses.
MM: The way things work, if you testify in a drug case, you
and your family are dead.
At this point his face remained expressionless, but two small
tears balanced on his lower eyelids. He pinched his eyes be-
tween a wide fat finger and his thumb and appeared annoyed
that his emotions had betrayed his macho self-image. The man
was clearly an operator and certainly did not lack in guile and
ruthlessness. If the performance was an act, however, it was an
understated and remarkably well-played piece of drama, without
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the hysterical excesses of other suspects I had interviewed, who
had fallen to their knees and put their hands to the sky, looking
up to the heavens to swear their innocence. I watched without
sympathy for a minute and then went to my briefcase for a
handiwipe which he took and dabbed at his eyes. His composure
thus restored, the rest of our interview continued as unemo-
tionally as it had been before the breakdown.
IS: What kind of records did the Anti-Gang Unit keep on what
its people did?
MM: There are records kept of arms that are issued, and some
other things. I am not sure what those things are.
IS: We have witnesses who put you at the scene of the Malary
killing. Where were you on that day? What were you doing?
MM: The day Malary was killed I was at the beach. I was
with my wife and kids. When I came back, the next day peo-
ple from the United States Embassy called me to get informa-
tion. It was a Monday. The DEA and CIA people asked me
where I was, what was going on. They said they were in the
neighborhood and heard a lot of shooting, [initially he used the
word explosion]. They asked me what had happened.
IS: I do not believe you, you are obviously not telling the
truth. [His version makes no sense since Malary was killed on
a Thursday. However, we obviously did not correct him. We
just told him we knew he was lying]. Ministers of Justice do
not get killed everyday, you must remember where you were
when you found out about it.
We took four photographs of him to show witnesses, who had
identified him at the different killings. He cooperated thor-
oughly in posing for the camera. When we told Ms. Uranie the
interview was over, the guard came in to put the handcuffs on
him. Mr. Morissaint shrugged and said there was no need. He
walked uncuffed and uncomplaining back to the jail where he
apparently felt safer than on the streets. It was also apparent
that, if he did start feeling that he would be safer on the streets,
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he could walk out of there at almost any time as long as the price
was right and the U.S. guards were not looking.
In twenty-three years of lawyering, particularly doing crimi-
nal defense work, I can think of few clients who more accurately
look the central casting part of a murderous thug. However, he
sat quietly and responded in a low key manner with apparent di-
rectness to all the questions we asked. Toward the end of the in-
terview I told him not only did I believe he was lying about his
participation in the murders, but that I would not expect him to
do otherwise at this stage of our investigation. "But why would I
lie to you," he asked, as if it were truly beyond his comprehen-
sion that he could be disbelieved. When I pointed out that if he
admitted to us his participation in any of the killings, that ad-
mission might be used against him, he just shrugged his shoul-
ders.
While Mr. Morissaint suggested that we contact the DEA
and CIA to confirm his role, and while it would be useful to be
able to confirm at least one bit of information he told us, we had
to consider the impact of making such contact. If we did so, it
would reveal to these agencies that Morissaint had broken cover
and suggest to them that we may be investigating people and
activities that could embarrass some of their own. Lives could be
at stake.
This is not the end of the story. On September 13, 1995, I
learned from Jean-Joseph Exum6, at that time the Haitian Min-
ister of Justice, that during the week of either August 31 or Sep-
tember 7, 1995, Morissaint had been forcibly taken by U.S.
troops and officials from the Petionville Prison, allegedly to be
tried in another city in Haiti for a robbery. This abduction was
done without notice to, or permission from, the Haitian govern-
ment. They had taken Morissaint to a hotel, and the next day
released him. According to Exum6, U.S. officials had told him
Morissaint had escaped. Exum6 claimed to have reliable infor-
mation that Morissaint was surreptitiously allowed into the
United States. Much of Morissaint's claims were later verified.
According to Allan Nairn, an investigative reporter for the Na-
tion, U.S. Embassy officials confirmed that Morissaint collabo-
rated with the CIA while working as an attach6 with the police.
Morissaint was a suspect in the Malary assassination and was




On March 7, 1997, other allegations made by Morissaint
were confirmed when Joseph Michel Francois was indicted in
Miami on charges that he helped smuggle thirty-three tons of co-
caine and heroin into the United States. According to the in-
dictment, as one of the de facto coup leaders of Haiti, Francois
placed the political and military structure of Haiti under his con-
trol to ship the drugs from Columbia through Haiti into the
United States.
V. CONCLUSION
Almost three years after American troops intervened to end
a murderous dictatorship in Haiti, the country continues to face
daunting problems. Its ministries are inept, its Parliament
somewhat paralyzed, its police too quick on the trigger, and its
justice system corrupt and incompetent. Yet this represents
progress of a sort. In less than three years, Haiti has gone from
a dictatorship dedicated to brutality and corruption to an inex-
perienced and incompetent but democratically elected govern-
ment that is striving to adhere to the rule of law. That is a
strong signal that the international community can best help by
staying involved, particularly by helping to create a secure envi-
ronment. The United States only does damage to the hope for
democracy by working against the attempt to bring de facto rul-
ers to justice.
Preval is not a seasoned, accomplished leader, but he is a re-
sponsible one. He has pushed through a fractious Parliament a
privatization program to sell inefficient public enterprises and
modernize Haiti's economy. The reforms are intended to qualify
Haiti for international funds that have been blocked; they are
also intended to improve the economy and help lift the Haitian
masses out of poverty. Whether they will do so, of course, is un-
certain.
The reforms have been opposed by former President Aris-
tide, who is leading a grass-roots peasant movement against the
privatization plan. The United States has complained about
Aristide's opposition, calling him a negative, anti-democratic in-
fluence in Haiti. This criticism misses the point of democracy.
Mr. Aristide's opposition shows that Haiti is in no danger of be-
coming a one-party dictatorship. A political split over economic
policy is an entirely appropriate disagreement in a democracy.
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The abuses committed by the Haitian National Police Force
are serious. The police must be held accountable for these
crimes. The government is doing just that. The police's Inspec-
tor General is investigating the killings. Most of the accused
have been fired and some are in jail. On a positive note, the
violence has not been the result of a deliberate policy, as were
the thousands of murders committed by the most recent dicta-
torship. Nevertheless, the police are in dire need of better
training, more resources, and stronger leadership.
The murders and other acts of violence recently committed
by the former military and paramilitary forces are extremely
dangerous to the Haitian people. They must be disarmed, prose-
cuted, and punished. They represent a real threat to the devel-
opment of a democracy. A related problem is Haiti's virtually
non-existent justice system. The building of such a system is a
top priority. The United States must stop throwing roadblocks
in the way of such development while mouthing pieties about the
importance of building such a system of justice.
If Haiti is to be able to feed itself, break the habits that come
from almost two-hundred years of occupation, dictatorship, and
mismanagement, and develop a mature democracy, it will likely
need economic, technical, and security help for years to come. It
deserves such help, not only because the United States has been
instrumental in creating and perpetuating these conditions, but
also because the Haitian people have started down the difficult
path to democracy. Haiti still faces extremely serious problems.
But it deserves the help of the international community because
it is now a fledgling democracy with a government and people
dedicated to solving them.
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